Thank you Deontos
Comment:
I always thought TWO for the price of ONE was a GOOD thing.
Everybody’s talking about the Kansas Appellate Decision?
What about this one from Arkansas’s Supreme Court?
Same issues, MERS and “black letter law” ….
MERS **Lost** and the Arkansas Supreme Court
cited the Landmark v KESLER Kansas Decision.
—————————————————————
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM, INC., APPELLANT, VS. SOUTHWEST HOMES OF ARKANSAS, APPELLEE
No. 08-1299
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
2009 Ark. LEXIS 121
March 19, 2009, Opinion Delivered
NOTICE:
THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Rehearing denied by Mortgage Elec. Registration
Sys. v. Southwest Homes of Ark., Inc., 2009 Ark. LEXIS 458 (Ark., Apr.
23, 2009)
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. CIV07-223-2, HON. DAVID S. CLINGER, JUDGE.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: George Nicholas Arnold – Counsel for the Appellant.
Howard Keith Morrison – Counsel for the Appellant.
Thomas D. Stockland – Counsel for the Appellee.
JUDGES: JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice. IMBER, DANIELSON and WILLS, JJ., concur.
OPINION BY: JIM HANNAH
OPINION
JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (”MERS”) appeals a
decision of the Benton County Circuit Court denying its motion to set
aside a decree of foreclosure and to dismiss the foreclosure action. 1
MERS alleges that the circuit court erred in ordering foreclosure
because as the holder of legal title it was a necessary party that was
never served. We affirm the circuit court and hold that under the
recorded deed of trust in this case, James C. East, as trustee under
the deed of trust, held legal title. Because MERS was at most the mere
agent of the lender Pulaski Mortgage Company, Inc., it held no property
interest and was not a necessary party. As this case presents an issue
of first impression, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme
Court Rule 1-2(b)(1).
1 Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.’s (”MERS”) motion
was [*2] entitled Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment; however, the
circuit court found, and the parties agree, that MERS was never served.
Because MERS was never served, it could not have failed to respond to
that service and suffer a default judgment. The relief sought was that
the decree of foreclosure be set aside and the foreclosure action be
dismissed.
This case arises from foreclosure on a 2006 mortgage granted in a
one-acre lot. A prior deed of trust also encumbered the property. In
2003, Jason Paul Lindsey and Julie Ann Lindsey entered into a deed of
trust on a one-acre lot in Benton County to secure a promissory note.
The lender on that deed of trust was Pulaski Mortgage, the trustee was
James C. East, and the borrowers were the Lindseys. MERS was listed on
the deed of trust as the “Beneficiary” acting “solely as nominee for
Lender,” and “Lender’s successors and assigns.” The second page of the
deed of trust states that “the Borrower understands and agrees that
MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by the Borrower
and further that MERS as nominee of the Lender has the right to
exercise all rights of the Lender including foreclosure.” The deed of
trust was recorded.
In [*3] 2006, the Lindseys granted the subject mortgage on the same
property to Southwest Homes of Arkansas, Inc. to secure a second
promissory note. This mortgage was recorded. On February 9, 2007,
Southwest Homes filed a Petition for Foreclosure in Rem against the
Lindseys under the 2006 mortgage. The Lindseys, the Benton County Tax
Collector, and “Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (Pulaski
Mortgage Company)” were listed as respondents. Pulaski Mortgage was
served; however, MERS was never served. Pulaski Mortgage did not file
an answer. 2 A Decree of Foreclosure in Rem was entered on April 4,
2007, and the property was auctioned to Southwest. An Order Approving
and Confirming Commissioner’s Sale was entered on May 8, 2007. In
February 2008, MERS learned of the foreclosure and moved for relief,
arguing it was a necessary party to the foreclosure action. The circuit
court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
2 Pulaski Mortgage was the lender of record. No assignment of the
deed of trust was recorded nor had Pulaski Mortgage’s security interest
been satisfied of record.
MERS asserts that it held legal title to the property and,
therefore, it was a necessary party to any action [*4] regarding title
to the property. The deed of trust indicates that MERS holds legal
title and is the beneficiary, as well as the nominee of the lender. It
further purports by contractual agreement with the borrower to grant
MERS the power to “exercise any and all rights” of the lender,
including the right of foreclosure. However the deed of trust provides
that all payments are to be made to the lender, that the lender makes
decisions on late payments, and that all rights to foreclosure are held
by the lender.
No payments on the underlying debt were ever made to MERS. MERS did
not service the loan in any way. It did not oversee payments,
delinquency of payments, or administration of the loan in any way.
Instead, MERS asserts to be a corporation providing electronic tracking
of ownership interests in residential real property security
instruments. See In re MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90, 861
N.E.2d 81, 828 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2006). According to MERS, it was developed
by the “real estate finance industry” and was designed to facilitate
the sale and resale of instruments in “the secondary mortgage market,
which include one of the government sponsored entities.”
MERS contracts with lenders to track security [*5] instruments in
return for an annual fee. MERSCORP, supra. Those who contract with MERS
are referred to by MERS as “MERS members.” According to MERS, MERS
members contractually agree to appoint MERS as their common agent for
all security instruments registered with MERS. 3 MERS asserts that it
holds the authority to exercise the rights of the lender, and for that
purpose, it holds bare legal title. Thus, it is alleged that a
principal-agent relationship existed between MERS and Pulaski Mortgage
under the contract terms of the deed of trust. 4
3 The Kansas Court of Appeals, in Lankmark National Bank v. Kesler,
40 Kan. App. 2d 325, 192 P.3d 177 (2008), likewise found that Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, Inc. acts as an agent. We note the
analysis in this case is consistent with our own but also note that the
Kansas Supreme Court granted review of the Landmark case.
4 MERS is listed as a nominee on the deed of trust. A nominee is “a
person designated to act on behalf of another, usu. in a very limited
way.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 (8th ed. 2004). A nominee is also a
“person who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who
receives and distributes funds for the benefit [*6] of others.” Id. As
discussed above, MERS was not designated to act on behalf of another
under the facts of this case. Further, it held no title in this case
where title vested in the trustee, and finally, it received and
distributed no funds for the benefit of others.
“An agent is a person who, by agreement with another called the
principal, acts for the principal and is subject to his control.”
Taylor v. Gill, 326 Ark. 1040, 1044, 934 S.W.2d 919, 922 (1996)
(quoting AMI 3d 701 (1989)). Thus, MERS, by the terms of the deed of
trust, and its own stated purposes, was the lender’s agent, including
not only Pulaski Mortgage but also any successors and assigns.
MERS asserts authority to act, arguing that once it becomes the
agent on a security instrument, it remains so for every MERS member
lender who acquires ownership. This authority is alleged to arise from
the contractual relationship between MERS and MERS members. Thus, MERS
argues it may act to preserve the rights of the lender regardless of
who the lender may be under the MERS electronic registration. We
specifically reject the notion that MERS may act on its own,
independent of the direction of the specific lender who holds the
repayment [*7] interest in the security instrument at the time MERS
purports to act. “[A]n agent is authorized to do, and to do only, what
it is reasonable for him to infer that the principal desires him to do
in the light of the principal’s manifestation and the facts as he knows
or should know them at the time he acts.” Hot Stuff, Inc. v. Kinko’s
Graphic Corp., 50 Ark. App. 56, 59, 901 S.W.2d 854, 856 (1995) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 33 (1958)). Nothing in the record shows that MERS had authority to
act. Here, Pulaski Mortgage was the lender and MERS’s principal.
Pulaski Mortgage was a named party in the foreclosure action. Thus,
MERS was not acting as the lender’s agent at the time it moved to set
aside the decree of foreclosure.
However, MERS also argues that it holds a property interest through
holding legal title. Specifically, it purports to hold legal title with
respect to the rights conveyed by the borrower to the lender. We
disagree.
“A deed of trust is ‘a deed conveying title to real property to a
trustee as security until the grantor repays a loan.’” First United
Bank v. Phase II, Edgewater Addition, 347 Ark. 879, 894, 69 S.W.3d 33,
44 (2001)(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary [*8] 773 (7th ed. 1999)); see
also House v. Long, 244 Ark. 718, 426 S.W.2d 814 (1968). The
encumbrance created by the deed of trust may be described as a lien.
See, e.g., First Amer. Nat’l Bank of Nashville v. Booth, 270 Ark. 702,
606 S.W. 2d 70 (1980).
Under a deed of trust, the borrower conveys legal title in the
property by a deed of trust to the trustee. Phase II, supra. “In this
state, the naked legal title to real property included in a mortgage
passes to the mortgagee, or to the trustee in a deed of trust, to make
the security available for the payment of the debt.” Harris v. Collins,
202 Ark. 445, 447, 150 S.W.2d 749, 750 (1941). The trustee is limited
in use of the title to passing title back to the grantor/borrower in
the case of payment, or to the lender in the event of foreclosure. See
Forman v. Holloway, 122 Ark. 341,183 S.W. 763 (1916). The lender holds
the indebtedness and is the beneficiary of the deed of trust. House,
supra. A trustee under a deed of trust is not a true trustee. Heritage
Oaks Partners v. First Amer. Title, Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 4th 339, 66
Cal. Rptr.3d 510 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Under a deed of trust, the
trustee’s duties are limited to (1) upon default undertaking
foreclosure [*9] and (2)
upon satisfaction of the debt to reconvey the deed of trust. Id.
In the present case, all the required parties to a deed of trust
under Arkansas law are present, the borrower in the Lindseys, the
Lender in Pulaski Mortgage, and the trustee in James C. East. Under a
deed of trust in Arkansas, title is conveyed to the trustee. Harris,
supra. MERS is not the trustee. Here, the deed of trust renamed James
C. East as the trustee. The deed of trust did not convey title to MERS.
Further, MERS is not the beneficiary, even though it is so designated
in the deed of trust. Pulaski Mortgage, as the lender on the deed of
trust, was the beneficiary. It receives the payments on the debt.
The cases cited by MERS only confirm that MERS could not obtain
legal title under the deed of trust. MERS relies on Hannah v.
Carrington, 18 Ark. 85 (1856); however, that case stands for the
proposition that a deed of trust vests legal tide in the trustee. We
are also cited to Shinn v. Kitchens, 208 Ark. 321, 326, 186 S.W.2d 168,
171 (1945), where this court stated that “[t]he trustee named in the
deeds of trust was a necessary party at the institution of the
foreclosure suit, as also, of course, was Kitchens, [*10] the holder of
the indebtedness.” East, as trustee, was a necessary party. MERS was
not. Finally, we are cited to Beloate v. New England Securities Co.,
165 Ark. 571, 575,265 S.W. 83 (1924), where this court stated that the
real owner of the debt, as well as the trustee in the mortgage, are
necessary parties in the action to recover the debt and foreclose the
mortgage. Again, this case supports the conclusion that East was a
necessary party and MERS was not.
Further, under Arkansas foreclosure law, a deed of trust is defined
as “a deed conveying real property in trust to secure the performance
of an obligation of the grantor or any other person named in the deed
to a beneficiary and conferring upon the trustee a power of sale for
breach of an obligation of the grantor contained in the deed of trust.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 18-50-101(2) (Repl. 2003). Thus, under the statutes,
and under the common law noted above, a deed of trust grants to the
trustee the powers MERS purports to hold. Those powers were held by
East as trustee. Those powers were not conveyed to MERS.
MERS holds no authority to act as an agent and holds no property
interest in the mortgaged land. It is not a necessary party. In [*11]
this dispute over foreclosure on the subject real property under the
mortgage and the deed of trust, complete relief may be granted whether
or not MERS is a party. MERS has no interest to protect. It simply was
not a necessary party. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a). MERS’s role in this
transaction casts no light on the contractual issues on appeal in this
case. See, e.g., Wilmans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Ark. 668,
144 S.W.3d 245 (2004).
Finally, we note that Arkansas is a recording state. Notice of
transactions in real property is provided by recording. See Ark. Code
Ann. § 14-15-404 (Supp. 2007). Southwest is entitled to rely upon what
is filed of record. In the present case, MERS was at best the agent of
the lender. The only recorded document provides notice that Pulaski
Mortgage is the lender and, therefore, MERS’s principal. MERS asserts
Pulaski Mortgage is not its principal. Yet no other lender recorded its
interest as an assignee of Pulaski Mortgage. Permitting an agent such
as MERS purports to be to step in and act without a recorded lender
directing its action would wreak havoc on notice in this state.
Affirmed.
IMBER, DANIELSON and WILLS, JJ., concur.
CONCUR BY: PAUL E. DANIELSON
CONCUR
CONCURRING [*12] OPINION.
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice
I concur that the circuit court’s order should be affirmed, but
write solely because I view the decisive issue to be whether MERS was,
pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) (2008), a necessary
party to the foreclosure action. It can generally be said that
“[n]ecessary parties to a foreclosure action are parties whose interest
are inseparable such that a court would be unable to determine the
rights of one party without affecting the rights of another.” 59A
C.J.S. Mortgages § 708 (2008). See also 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 647
(2008) (”[A]ll persons who are beneficially interested, either in the
estate mortgaged or the demand secured, are proper or necessary parties
to a suit to foreclose.”). Moreover, “[p]ersons having no interest are
neither necessary nor proper parties, and the mere fact that they were
parties to transactions out of which the mortgage arose does not give
them such an interest as to make them necessary parties to an action to
foreclose
the mortgage.” Id. Indeed, our rules of civil procedure contemplate the same.
Rule 19(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure speaks to necessary parties:
(a) Persons to Be [*13] Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject
to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1)
in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or, (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (i) as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, or, (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
If he has not been joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party. If he should join as a plaintiff, but refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant; or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.
Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2008).
Here, a review of the deed of trust for the subject property reveals
four parties to the deed: (1) Jason Paul Lindsey and Julie Ann Lindsey,
“Borrower”; (2) James C. East, “Trustee”; (3) MERS, “(solely as nominee
for Lender, as hereinafter defined, and Lender’s successors and
assigns)”; and (4) Pulaski Mortgage Company, “Lender.” The question,
then, is whether MERS, [*14] as nominee, was a necessary party that had
an interest “so situated that the disposition of the action in [its]
absence may” have impaired its ability to protect its interest or left
a subsequent purchaser or other subject to a substantial risk by reason
of its interest. The answer is no; MERS, as nominee, was not a
necessary party to the foreclosure action, because it held no such
interest.
Initially, I must note that my review of the deed’s notice provision
reveals that the deed clearly contemplated the Lender as the party with
interest, in that it provided:
13. Notices. . . . Any notice to Lender shall be given by first
class mail to Lender’s address stated herein or any address Lender
designates by notice to Borrower. Any notice provided for in this
Security’ Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or
Lender when given as in this paragraph.
Here, as stated in the circuit court’s order of foreclosure. Pulaski
Mortgage, as Lender, was served with notice of the foreclosure action,
in accord with paragraph thirteen.
But, in addition, MERS claims that because it holds legal title, it
has an interest so as to render it a necessary party pursuant to Rule
19(a). Indeed, pursuant [*15] to the deed of trust, MERS held “only
legal title to the interests granted” by the Lindseys,
but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS, (as nominee
for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right to
exercise any and all of those interests, including, but not limited to,
the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action
required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and
canceling this Security Instrument.
“Legal title” is defined as “[a] title that evidences apparent
ownership but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or a
beneficial interest.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1523 (8th ed. 2004)
(emphasis added). Thus, as evidenced by the definition, holding legal
title alone in no way demonstrates the interest required by Rule 19(a).
MERS further claims that its status as nominee is evidence of its
interest in the property, making it a necessary party. However, merely
serving as nominee was recently held by one court to be insufficient to
demonstrate an interest rising to the level to be a necessary party. In
Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 40 Kan. App. 2d 325, 192 P.3d 177
(2008), review granted, (Feb. 11, 2009). MERS also [*16] asserted that
it was a necessary party to the foreclosure suit at issue. There, the
district court found that MERS was not a necessary party, and the
appellate court affirmed. Just as here, MERS was a party to the
mortgage “solely as nominee for Lender.” 40 Kan. App. 2d at 327, 192
P.3d at 179. Based on that status, the Kansas court found that MERS was
in essence, an agent for the lender, as its right to act to enforce the
mortgage was strictly limited. See id.
Agreeing with MERS that a foreclosure judgment could be set aside
for failure to join a “contingently necessary party,” the Kansas court
observed that a party was “contingently necessary” under K.S.A. 60-219
if “the party claims an interest in the property at issue and the party
is so situated that resolution of the lawsuit without that party may
‘as a practical matter substantially impair or impede [its] ability to
protect that interest.’” Id. at 328, 192 P.3d at 180 (quoting K.S.A.
60-219). Notably, the language of K.S.A. 60-219 quoted by the Kansas
court is practically identical to the language of Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
The Kansas appellate court noted that MERS received no funds and
that the mortgage required the borrower [*17] to pay his monthly
payments to the lender. See id. It also observed, just as in the case
at hand, that the notice provisions of the mortgage “did not list MERS
as an entity to contact upon default or foreclosure.” Id. at 330, 192
P.3d at 181. After declaring that MERS did not have a “sort of
substantial rights and interests” that had been found in a prior
decision and noting that “a party with no beneficial interest is
outside the realm of necessary parties,” the Kansas court concluded
that “the failure to name and serve MERS as a defendant in a
foreclosure action in which the lender of record has been served” was
not such a fatal defect that the foreclosure judgment should be set
aside. Id. at 331, 192 P.3d at 181-82.
It is my opinion that the same holds true in the instant case. Here,
Pulaski Mortgage, the lender for whom MERS served as nominee, was
served in the foreclosure action. But, further, neither MERS’s holding
of legal title, nor its status as nominee, demonstrates any interest
that would have rendered it a necessary party pursuant to Ark. R. Civ.
P. 19(a). For these reasons, I concur that the circuit court’s order
should be affirmed.
IMBER and WILLS, JJ., join.
H Gosh,
Each assignment has to be verified. Remember also that each time it was “assigned” to a pool it was probably “pledged” … So you have many companies and/or people (and “holders of certificates”) who are real parties in interest (for each pool). According to FAS 140-3 the only true way they can sell it is in an open market transaction (did they?) If they did how did EMC get it back? If I sold my car and it was sold 3 times and I “found” the car and started driving it (I still had the keys), I could tell the police that I owned it at one time so I still own it. Anyway, at the very least you have JOINDER issues – all of the real parties in interest have to join together in order to properly adjudicate the issue. Are you in a judicial state or non-judicial? Of course there are many other issues, these are just the ones that jumped out.
Prove each assignment with a competent witness. Challange everything.
Disclaimer: I am not an attorney and this is not legal advice. Consult with a competent local attorney.
Thanks,
Dan Edstrom
dmedstrom@hotmail.com
Hey Nye Lavalle why don’t you tell your great prezident to uphold this rule of law he keeps talking about instead of giving the pretender lenders more money… THIS IS NOT THE UNITED BANKS OF AMERICA. A question that everyone in court deserves an answer to, DOES THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING THE LENDER NEED TO SHOW THAT HE IS DULY AUTHORIZED BY THE LENDER TO REPRESENT THEM?
First, it points out the fact that a lot depends on the court that hears a case — at least until the appeal. Second, this ruling emphasizes what compliance experts have known for a long time — “when it comes to TILA, ‘hypertechnicality reigns.’”
This is from: http://www.bankersonline.com/infovault/courtwatch_hamm_jones_til_101707.pdf
Thanks,
Dan Edstrom
dmedstrom@hotmail.com
In regards to the below 2002 ruling article – the title is:
Two Bad Loans Don’t Equal One Good Loan
This seems to apply today with loan mods …
Thanks,
Dan Edstrom
dmedstrom@hotmail.com
Case from 2002 regarding fiduciary relationship, disclosure of material information and blanket waivers.
From http://www.bankersonline.com/lending/so_salleecase.html
Summary
The Court held that a lender absent special circumstances is not in a fiduciary relationship with its borrowers. A lender however does have any obligation to disclose known facts regarding the appraisal value of real property and may be liable for fraudulent misrepresentation if such disclosures are not made. In addition the existence in an extension agreement of a blanket waiver of all claims against the bank may be held unenforceable if the bank induces the debtor to execute the agreement with the promise of future financing.
Thanks,
Dan Edstrom
dmedstrom@hotmail.com
Fair Debt collection practices – check out this ruling where the creditor was actually found to be a debt collector. This may apply to many foreclosure actions, inter alia, because the attorneys are NOT reviewing the actual files … Plus the actual creditor is NOT who they say it is …
This is from: http://www.bankersonline.com/lending/mbg_fdcpacase.html#
The Court’s Ruling
The District Court ruled
that Dickerson and Household each qualified as a “debt collector” that could be held liable under the FDCPA for misleading communications with debtors;
although Household would not normally constitute a debt collector under the Act, it qualified as one under what is known as the “false name” exception to this rule. A creditor or an affiliate of a creditor who uses someone else’s name so as to suggest to the debtor that a third party is involved in the debt collection process, when in fact that party is not involved, can be treated as a “debt collector” for FDCPA purposes;
Dickerson played no genuine role as an attorney in Household’s debt collection efforts;
Dickerson’s letter to Nielsen and the other class members was in reality from Household and Household was simply using Dickerson’s name to suggest that he and his firm were involved in the attempt to collect the debts;
Household should be treated as a debt collector and held liable to the extent the letter was false or misleading;
in order for the letter not to mislead the recipient as to the nature of the attorney’s involvement with the debt, the attorney must have direct and personal involvement in the mailing of the letter — e.g., by reviewing the file to determine whether the letter should be sent, or by approving the mailing based on recommendations by others;
the firm’s “review” was no more than a deceptive “veneer of compliance” with FDCPA.
Thanks,
Dan Edstrom
dmedstrom@hotmail.com
This is exactly what I am fighting. My note was securitized in a 1998 Trust, which disappeared into an EMC Trust, which disappeared into a SACO CDO.
In 2001, note was placed into foreclosure by Fairbanks. Federal complaint filed, and Fairbanks entered into a settlement agreement to correct. Chase reassigned note back to BFP, which has been “dead” since 1999 in 2007, effective 2001, prior to Fairbanks fradulent foreclosure. Settlement declared null and void since Fairbanks never had servicing rights based on ante-dating of assignment. Note assigned in 2004 by “Dead” corporation and resecuritized into EMC Trust. EMC Trust sold to SACO swap fund. EMC seeking to foreclose, and produced a “copy” of an allonge (not entire note) dated 1999 assigned in blank “without recourse”. Judge claims since it appears that EMC “USED” to hold the note, they can take house in rem!! What is wrong with these Judges – Willfull Blindness?
Thanks for the thought Nye,
and greetings from Virginia, DC and MD
Here is a request for dismissal by GMAC on a case I just found involving TILA, RESPA, HOEPA, etc.
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2008cv1853-32
GMAC’s SEC filings state that they are a party to lawsuits from time to time. If ANY law was broken in connection with the origination or servicing of a loan, they will have to repurchase it from the Trust …
It seems to me that this repurchase obligation (if identified in your lawsuit as ANY law broken) would take precedent over and invalidate your foreclosure. At the very least it now adds them (GMAC in this case) as a real an indispensible party.
Would you have to win summary judgment for them (GMAC in this case) to add them as a real party in interest? Or merely the allegation that a law was broken? Of course they should be added (through Joinder) anyway because of other reasons (pledging, advances, credit default swaps, etc).
Thanks,
Dan Edstrom
dmedstrom@hotmail.com
Actually, that’s about how it works with different gestations and variations of the common theme. FRAUD!
I go back to the equation I wrote in 1998 when I was trying to get everyone on board and the Dems and Republications would trade off blame. It’s as simple as this:
Borrower Fraud/Deceit = Investor/Shareholder Fraud & Deceit
If you are cheating the borrower at origination and/or servicing, you are simply “cooking the books” creating income you are not entitled to; a debt you do not own; an inflated balance where investors are paying a higher servicing fee that rightful; a share price and book value inflated by vapor assets etc…
Get to the bottom of the accounting and show how they are defrauding the investor, shareholder and/or government and that’s when you get your cases settled!
WOW that is powerful stuff.